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Abstract 
 
Long-term care (LTC) is the largest insurable risk facing the elderly in most western societies. 
Paradoxically, institutional responses to the need to insure ex-ante (before the contingency 
occurs) the financial risks of needing LTC (by means of social and private insurance and self-
insurance) exhibit limited development. In contrast, mechanisms to finance LTC ex-post 
continue to develop, primarily those supported by the public sector (by means of subsidies or 
tax deductions) and the family (by means of intergenerational transfers). Both ex-ante and ex-
post types of financing mechanisms are found to be subject to shortcomings which give rise to 
dilemmas for public policy. Governments confront these dilemmas in different ways, causing 
a great deal of heterogeneity in the financing and provision of LTC services across Europe. 
 
Keywords: long-term care, old age dependency, long-term care insurance, subsidies, tax 
deductions for providing formal care.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term care (LTC) is defined as “a range of services required by persons with a 
reduced degree of functional capacity, physical or cognitive, and who are consequently 
dependent for an extended period of time on help with basic activities of daily living” 
(Colombo et al., 2011).   
The ageing of populations (or the expansion of the probability of survival to older age) is 
expected to be accompanied by an increase in the need for LTC services
1
. Demand expansion 
takes place in a gradual way, but expenditure on LTC has been  rising even faster than that on 
health care. More specifically, while spending on LTC in Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries averaged 1.5% of GDP in 2008, 
this share is predicted to more than double by 2050 given current trends (Colombo and 
Mercier, 2012). This pace of growth cannot be explained only by the increasing demand due 
to population ageing alone. Rather, other social determinants are at play, more specifically, 
there has also been a decline in the supply of informal caregiving caused by changes in family 
structure and higher female labor-market participation (Pezzin and Steinberg Schone, 1999).  
Given that ageing and social change are unlikely to follow different trends than today, one 
should expect a growing reliance on formal LTC comprising personal care, community care, 
institutional care in nursing homes, as well as assisted living facilities. Although planning of 
old age dependency is not always something individuals wish to do when young and healthy, 
if they fail to pre-fund these services before the need arises (ex-ante), they themselves, their 
family, or the state end up facing their (often catastrophic) cost ex-post. Among alternative 
ways to pre-fund LTC risks, one can identify the following: insurance, public welfare, 
individual saving, and family support. In Europe and in OECD countries generally, the cost of 
LTC has traditionally been borne by the elderly and their families themselves or by the public 
purse (either universally or as a payer of last resort). However, insurance has exhibited very 
limited development (see Costa-Font and Courbage (2012) for a survey of financing 
arrangements). 
In view of predicted growth of LTC expenditure combined with pressure to stabilize 
government expenditure, a growing interest in private LTC insurance as a source of 
complementary finance or as an alternative to self-insurance or public subsidization might be 
expected. However, some observers point to the problem of adverse selection (meaning that 
those with a high risk of being in need of LTC services typically buy LTC coverage). They 
advocate an extension of social insurance (Barr, 2010), which however is ill suited to control 
                                               
1
 In OECD countries, the average share of LTC recipients among the oldest age bracket is over five times that 
among those aged between 65 and 79 years old (Colombo et al., 2011). 
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moral hazard (meaning that insurance coverage tends to encourage utilization of the service 
covered). A major problem with private insurance is that people think they cannott afford it at 
an age it would be optimal to purchase it (Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2009). This causes 
many to rely on public support or to self-insure (i.e. to accumulate extra savings to cover the 
cost of LTC). This is in sharp contrast with the risk characteristics of LTC, which make it a 
paradigmatic case for insurance. With 35 to 50 % of the elderly population using LTC during 
their lifetime (Frank, 2012), it can be argued that loss probability is relatively low. This 
should translate into low premiums per unit of coverage provided loadings for administrative 
expense, moral hazard and profit are reasonable. On the other hand, the loss can be high when 
it occurs. For instance, those who enter a nursing home in the United States spend more than 
three years there at a cost of US$ 20-50,000 per year. Absent insurance coverage, those 
affected suffer a substantial wealth loss that may attain even catastrophic dimensions. Almost, 
one out of six persons in need of LTC have almost catastrophic expenses in the United States 
(Stevenson et al., 2010). Finally, there exists a financial product called reverse mortgage, a 
loan secured on a value of a property, which can be used to supplement income during 
retirement or to finance LTC needs. However, demand for reverse mortgages has been limited 
and failed to develop even in European countries where housing exhibited a significant bubble 
(Costa-Font et al., 2010).  Hence, it appears that welfare improvement can result from 
insurance compared to self-insurance (Frank, 2012). 
Paradoxically, the uptake of private LTC insurance has been slow even in the United 
States, where only the ‘relatively poor’ can rely on public welfare (the Medicaid program), 
which typically has means-tested benefits. This raises several dilemmas for public policy. For 
instance, should private saving be encouraged, enabling citizens to self-insure against LTC 
risk while earning interest? However, as shown by Zweifel and Strüwe (1996b) this may 
induce children to provide less informal care, causing an increase in the cost of formal LTC 
(e.g. through earlier admission to a nursing home). Since nursing homes are heavily 
subsidized in many countries, the current status quo is likely to be burdening the public purse 
both by tax revenue forgone (through tax breaks for savings) and by increased public 
expenditure (on nursing homes). Alternatively, one may opt for extending social insurance to 
cover also LTC, as Germany did in 1995. However, at the time of inception the contribution 
rate was 1% of wage income; at present it is 2.05% (Gesetz zur Neuausrichtung der 
Pflegeversicherung, 2012). During the same period, the average contribution rate for social 
health insurance increased from 13.2% to 15.5% (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-
Württemberg, 2013). Evidently, social LTC insurance has triggered a cost explosion dwarfing 
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that associated with health care. While not falling on the public purse, it does curtail net wage 
incomes, creating a problem especially for the working poor. 
This paper addresses the policy dilemmas in financing LTC in Europe. It starts in Section 2 
by expounding the case for insurance as a way to finance LTC expenditures. The following 
section provides a characterisation of the funding schemes in existence. As one would expect, 
government of (European) OECD countries have responded in different ways to the challenge 
of rapidly increasing LTC expenditure, resulting in considerable heterogeneity that seems to 
reflect differences in national attitudes towards the funding of LTC (as shown in Section 4). 
This paper is rounded off by a few conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. THE CASE FOR LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 
 
The literature has expounded several factors explaining the sluggishness in the 
development of the market for LTC insurance in the United States, and its near nonexistence 
in most European countries. Evidence points towards important demand-side factors (Brown 
and Finkelstein, 2009) that impose significant limits on the expansion of private insurance. 
Supply-side factors (such as the design of LTC insurance) cannot be disregarded either. In 
particular, public insurance schemes have the potential of crowding out private insurance and 
savings. Also, the increasing importance of the elderly as a voter group in several European 
countries may help to shift LTC higher up in the agenda for public insurance programs.  
Other issues include the demand for more responsive, innovative, and high-quality 
services, typically resulting in in increased LTC expenditures. This pressure is compounded 
by a fall in the relative size of the working-age population which creates competition for 
attracting social workers, that translates into salary increases. At the same time, the supply of 
informal care is dwindling due to higher female labor-market participation, declining family 
size, and changing family values. All these influences point to an expansion of people’s use of 
and reliance on LTC services, even when they may be counterbalanced somewhat by a 
process of de-institutionalisation, as pointed out by some scholars (Lakadawalla and 
Philipson, 2002). 
To protect against the financial risk of LTC, various mechanisms exist or could be made 
available, respectively. One set of mechanisms is of the ex-ante type, comprising measures 
that are taken before the onset of dependency. At the level of the individual, one possibility is 
prevention which has two components. The probability of needing formal LTC can be 
reduced by creating incentives for family members and friends to provide informal care. By 
the same token, the future cost of LTC can be lowered to the extent that informal care may 
delay admission to a nursing home. Alternatively, individuals may accumulate savings 
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designed to finance future LTC expenditure. The dilemma confronting them, however, is that 
potential caregivers (in particular children) may adversely respond to these measures, 
exhibiting so-called intergenerational moral hazard. One variant of intergenerational moral 
hazard is the weakening of social norms. Potential caregivers, seeing that their recipients of 
care have income to afford the payment of LTC insurance premiums or to generate the 
necessary savings, may be less inclined to sacrifice their time and savings to provide support 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010). The other variant is through bequests. Especially 
children as heirs know that bequeathable wealth declines when the parent has to rely on costly 
formal care. Through their efforts, they can avoid or at least postpone e.g. admission to a 
nursing home. However, LTC insurance has the side effect of protecting the bequest, thus 
undermining children’s incentive to make this effort (Zweifel and Strüwe, 1996a, 1998)2. This 
side effect is absent from trust saving designed to provide for the cost of LTC (Zweifel and 
Strüwe, 1996b). 
Another set of mechanisms for funding LTC is of the ex post type. They are activated after 
the onset of old-age dependency, comprising family bailout, the use of housing equity for 
financing LTC (‘reverse mortgages’), and the subsidization of informal and formal LTC. 
Again, intergenerational moral hazard looms large. At a time when the younger generation 
has to struggle to make ends meet, fairness does not dictate participation in a family bailout. 
As to reverse mortgages, they are viable only in highly developed capital markets and given 
reasonably stable housing prices – conditions not satisfied notably in southern European 
OECD countries. Moreover, reverse mortgages permit potential recipients of LTC services to 
continue living independently. This serves to preserve their non-housing wealth in which 
children as heirs may be especially interested. Therefore, their incentives work both ways: on 
the one hand, providing some informal care keeps the parent in her home; on the other hand, 
non-housing wealth is protected by the insurance provided by the reverse mortgage. 
Subsidisation of informal care may trigger intergenerational moral hazard too because it 
has the potential of crowding out care that would have been provided voluntary by family 
members and friends. However, intergenerational moral hazard is likely to have maximum 
effect when the government subsidises formal LTC services. First, the element of social 
control that facilitates support within the family is absent now. Second, however, potential 
recipients of LTC are likely to exhibit moral hazard as well. Knowing that they can expect a 
public subsidy, they have little reason to pay the premium of LTC insurance. Indeed, Brown 
                                               
2
 Actually, children rather than parents might have an interest in the purchase of LTC insurance. Courbage and 
Eeckhoudt (2012) study the conditions for this to happen. 
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and Finkelstein (2008) found evidence suggesting that the extension of U.S. Medicaid to 
cover nursing home care crowded out private LTC insurance. 
However, there may be an additional parental response, reflecting intergenerational moral 
hazard once again. As argued by Courbage and Zweifel (2011), parents can count on child 
effort designed to prevent the need for formal LTC (in particular admission to a nursing 
home). Anticipating this, they have less incentive to take up LTC insurance. Using survey 
information from Sanghai, Xu and Zweifel (2013) are able to test four of the predictions 
derived from Courbage and Zweifel (2011). They find preliminary supporting evidence in 
three cases, while the fourth is not contradicted. Indeed, public provision and subsidization of 
LTC might induce this type of bilateral intergenerational moral hazard, with unfavorable 
consequences for the public purse in most instances (Courbage and Zweifel, 2011). 
In sum, moral hazard turns out to constitute a major challenge to private LTC insurance. 
However, as argued by Zweifel (2013), social insurance is less capable of confronting this 
challenge, being bound to the solidarity principle. This principle calls for equal contributions 
regardless of future risks and past loss experience, preventing a social LTC insurer from 
offering lower contributions in return for an increased degree of cost sharing or loss-free 
years. In automobile insurance e.g. these instruments are used to reign in moral hazard effects; 
they could be used by a private (but hardly a social) LTC insurer. In turn, imposing 
monopolistic scheme, social insurance does not have to deal with the adverse selection 
problem of private insurance (meaning that a competitor is able to skin off the favorable risks 
from an incumbent, who may be driven out of the market). 
Still, whilst the determinants of private LTC insurance uptake are well understood (Brown 
and Finkelstein, 2007), the relationships between the different ex ante and ex post alternatives 
for ensuring the provision of LTC are as complex but have received less attention.  
 
3. CHARACTERIZING THE SCHEMES 
 
The financial schemes designed to protect individuals from the cost of LTC can be 
characterised along several dimensions. One distinction is between the type of care covered 
(formal care provided by institutions versus formal care provided by day persons). Another 
distinction is between the financing of services in kind and cash payments. Typically, cash 
payments provide for choice but can be used for informal care only, as e.g. Austria, France, 
Italy and the Czech Republic. Some countries follow the example of the United Kingdom by 
fixing budgets reflecting the degree of dependency while letting beneficiaries allocate the 
funds (e.g., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Spain). Differences also exist in the extent of 
coverage. Some schemes limit their coverage to services provided by (public) nursing homes 
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and similar institutions such as day care centres. In several Nordic countries, the return to the 
private home and purchase of auxiliary devices is also paid for. Another distinction that could 
be made is the one between catastrophic and non-catastrophic risks. Frank et al. (2013) 
report that 5% of Americans incur LTC expenditure of US$260,000, while average household 
wealth after retirement is about US$200,000. Catastrophic risks, involving low frequencies 
(hence low loadings for administrative expense) but high loss amounts could be covered by 
private LTC insurance on favorable terms. Non-catastrophic risks might be covered by health 
insurance, serving to avoid the awkward combination of generous health coverage with often 
scant LTC coverage. On the other hand, integration in health insurance entails the risk of 
“medicalisation” of LTC, which may already have happened in view of the LTC cost 
explosion in Germany (see Section 2 again). 
A distinction of limited importance is between upfront payment by the insurer and 
upfront payment by the beneficiary. In the absence of cost sharing, liquidity constraints are 
sometimes cited as a barrier to access; however, transitory support by the family is available 
in most cases. In the presence of cost sharing, both payment alternatives cause beneficiaries to 
bear the net cost of treatment with some delay. 
Much more important is type and degree of cost sharing. In the Nordic countries, 
beneficiaries bear a fixed percentage of LTC expenditure, as is often the case in (private) 
health insurance. This type has the advantage of reducing moral hazard at all levels of 
expenditure; on the other hand, it can expose the insured to substantial financial risk. In most 
countries with social LTC insurance, copayment is defined as a residual (e.g., Germany, 
Australia, Austria, and France). As long as the insured expect to remain below the limit with 
their LTC expenditure, there is no mitigation of moral hazard. However, as shown by the U.S. 
experience cited above, the cost of LTC can attain very high values that are deemed 
catastrophic. Unable to predict it, beneficiaries may be motivated to seek out lower-cost 
alternatives. Of course, especially in the case of social LTC insurance, political pressure is 
likely to build up, calling for a wide definition of “catastrophic”, with evident implications for 
contribution rates. In analogy to (private) health insurance, co-payment may be turned around 
to apply to the low, non-catastrophic end of the LTC cost distribution. In this vein, a recent 
U.K. proposal (Dilnot Commission, 2011) seeks to implement a deductible of £35,000.  
Other distinctions are more of a philosophical than political nature. Even if access to LTC 
services is explicitly recognised as an entitlement, lack of finance forces this entitlement to 
remain on paper. By way of contrast, countries that lack formal entitlement may have 
generous schemes – until moral hazard effects cause them to become stingier. Likewise 
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granting universal access (or coverage) based on need likely is unsustainably in the long term 
and must be replaced by means testing to determine the level of cost sharing
3
.  
Finally, care can be financed and provided by different levels of government. In the UK, 
France and Nordic countries, the local level is responsible; in others (e.g., Germany and 
Spain) it is the region, while France has a national scheme. 
Summing up, schemes designed to protect citizens from the (often high) cost of LTC can 
be characterised in many different ways. While some of the distinctions show out to be of 
limited relevance, the type and degree of cost sharing imposed on beneficiaries appears to be 
crucial in view of the moral hazard effects found in Section 2. 
 
4. EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 
 
Social security in general redistributes income and wealth and is therefore subject to the 
interests of politicians who seek (re-)election. Its structure and development therefore reflects 
a country’s political process, resulting in heterogeneity between countries of comparable 
income levels. The same heterogeneity characterizes the schemes designed to help citizens 
cope with the cost of LTC. This becomes evident from Figure 1 which on the right-hand side 
exhibits the share of GDP devoted to LTC expenditure. This share ranges from below 0.1% in 
Portugal to 3.6% in Sweden, with the OECD average at 1.5%. Most of this expenditure is 
public. Again, Portugal is at the low end with 0.1% of GDP and Sweden at the other extreme 
with 3.6%. The OECD average stands at 1.16% as of 2008. As a rule, countries with a large 
public sector involvement exhibit high total LTC expenditure relative to GDP. However, there 
are exceptions. Notably, Switzerland spends 2.1% of its GDP on LTC services, but a mere 
0.8% of GDP is public expenditure. Conversely, a full 62% of all LTC expenditure is 
financed privately. Similarly, Finland spends some 3.5% of its GDP on LTC services, of 
which 1.8% is financed using public funds. Therefore, almost one-half of the finance comes 
from private source. 
Yet, overall, a high GDP share of public and total LTC expenditure tend to go together. This 
pattern is consistent with two hypotheses, 
 
H1: Moral hazard effects are particularly strong when public rather than private funds are 
used to finance the cost of LTC (see Section 3). 
 
                                               
3
 In the U.S., Medicaid (the public health care financing program for low-income people) funds 44% of LTC 
expenditure, while 19% are paid out of pocket. The only ex-ante mechanism available is private LTC 
insurance, covering 6.4% of the population. 
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H2: Public finance of LTC services crowds out private alternatives such as trust saving, 
private LTC insurance, and family bailout (see Section 2). 
 
If one or both of these hypotheses should be true, public involvement in the financing of LTC 
likely is unsustainable in the longer term. On the one hand, the recent financial crisis has 
caused government debt to soar, making cutbacks in social programs almost inevitable. On 
the other hand, even if naïve extrapolations are misleading (as argued in Section 1), the 
demand for LTC services will continue to rise while the supply of informal care will continue 
to decline. In combination, a substantial future increase in LTC expenditure is the almost 
certain future consequence. 
 
 
Figure 1. Total and Public LTC expenditure in % of GDP, 2008 
 
 
Source: OECD Health Data, 2011. 
 
In order to assess the scope for future reforms in the financing of LTC services, it is of interest 
to have information regarding citizens’ expectations. The dash bars of Figure 2 reveals that in 
European countries as diverse as Greece and Finland, a majority of survey respondents state 
that using one’s own financial means for ensuring the provision of LTC services would be 
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best. By and large, these countries are characterized by a high to very high degree of tax 
financing (see Finland, but also Belgium and France in Figure 1). The light bars reflect the 
popularity of private LTC insurance as an alternative. Here, almost 45% of Dutch respondents 
deem private insurance to be the best source of finance. France follows with 35%; 
interestingly it is currently characterized by a good deal (54%) of social (rather than private) 
insurance. Among 15 lower-income countries, seven exhibit a majority who believe it is best 
for the elderly to be able to tap their own funds. Not in one of these countries does the share 
of persons judging private insurance to be the best source of finance exceed 20%. The 
remaining respondents presumably look to the government in their search of a “good” source 
of finance.  
 
Figure 2. Who should pay for people’s LTC? 
 
 
Question: “Imagine an elderly father or mother who lives alone and can no longer manage to live without regular 
help because of her or his physical or mental health condition. In your opinion, what would be the best option for 
people in this situation?” 
Source: Eurobarometer survey, 2007.  
 
 
What governments can do without burdening their budgets with the cost of LTC is to make 
LTC insurance compulsory. Figure 3 reports attitudes towards this solution. As is often the 
case, private preferences and social attitudes diverge. In contrast to Figure 2, where private 
LTC insurance coverage is nowhere the preferred solution (not even in The Netherlands), in 
13 higher-income European countries a majority expresses (total) agreement with the view 
that citizens should be mandated to take up LTC insurance (even in The Netherlands). Only 
Danish and Finish respondents seem to be skeptical. In all lower-income countries, strong 
majorities agree or totally agree with the introduction of compulsory (social) LTC insurance. 
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Xu and Zweifel, 2013). These attitudes seem to neglect the financial constraints confronting 
both social insurers and governments (who act as financiers of last resort). These observations 
are in accordance with a third hypothesis.  
 
H3. In most European countries, there is a “latent demand” for compulsory LTC insurance, 
which might crowd out private LTC insurance.  
 
Figure 3. Attitudes towards compulsory LTC insurance 
 
Question: “Every individual should be obliged to contribute to an insurance scheme that will finance care if and 
when it is needed” 
Source: Eurobarometer survey.  
 
 
Yet, individuals are acutely aware of the financial constraints they are subject to. According 
to Figure 4, spending about 5% of one’s income on LTC services is judged reasonable in 
Denmark, while a minority of 30% finds LTC services affordable. This divergence is very 
marked in Great Britain, Belgium, and Ireland (note that these countries exhibit clear 
majorities in favor of compulsory LTC insurance; see Figure 3 again). In just one of the 29 
countries sampled (Slovenia), respondents deem LTC services affordable; everywhere else 
this is a minority opinion.  
In all but six countries, on average no more than 20% of disposable income devoted to 
LTC is judged reasonable. This limit is exceeded in six countries which are (except Sweden) 
still characterized by strong family ties. Possibly, respondents in these countries think they 
can (reasonably) afford to sacrifice up to 30% of their income to the benefit of parents in need 
of LTC. These attitudes may be contrasted with the fact that average LTC expenditure can 
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represent as much as 60% of disposable income for all but those in the top quintile of the 
income distribution (Colombo et al, 2011). This gives rise to hypothesis 
 
H4. The percentage of personal income devoted to LTC deemed “reasonable” is relatively 
high in countries where the family continues to be primarily responsible for providing LTC.  
 
If true, this hypothesis points to a future challenge. Even in southern and eastern European 
countries, family ties are likely to weaken due to increased labor market mobility. Finally, the 
low popularity of private LTC insurance is not easily reconciled with the view that an income 
share of 30% and more spent on LTC services is reasonable. Shares of this magnitude exceed 
by far those devoted to health insurance (13% of GDP or less in European OECD countries, 
amounting to some 17% of personal income as in Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.  “Affordable” and “Reasonable” LTC expenditure relative to Income (Y%)  
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey, 2009  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has addressed some important policy dilemmas in the funding of LTC in Europe. 
We have discussed the problem of limited insurance, and the possible interactions between 
different forms of financing and provision of LTC, focusing primarily on European countries. 
We have argued that national LTC schemes differ substantially from one European country to 
another for reasons that span beyond economic efficiency. This follows from both historical 
and societal choices about individual and collective responsibility towards care for elderly and 
disabled people. This heterogeneity also reflects that LTC finance needs to be considered as 
part of an overall retirement strategy rather than as a simple extension of health insurance, 
even if one can separate the goals of consumption smoothing (retirement) from insurance 
(LTC). To stimulate the uptake of LTC insurance, either as a complementary or a substitutive 
tolls, one can think of using subsidies and tax incentives encouraging the uptake of LTC 
insurance combined with transparency about the limits confronting both public insurance and 
pension schemes. However, for achieving this transparency, the role of public insurance has 
to be delimited, combined with an increased awareness of how (un)affordable LTC can be.  
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